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A recent issue of STI-Studies (vol. 5, 
no. 2) contained two articles, which 
both addressed the so-called ‘Mode 
2-diagnosis’ by Nowotny et al. (2001). 
In particular, they both made refer-
ence to the affiliated concept of ‘so-
cial robustness’. Given this topical 
overlap, the editors of STI-Studies 
encouraged the authors of the two 
articles to provide comments on each 
other’s paper. My own paper (Hansen 
2009) is concerned primarily with the 
theoretical consistency and analytical 
value of the concept of ‘social robust-
ness’ for comparative analysis of pub-
lic engagement processes, and was 
conceived as an attempt to lay a con-
ceptual ground for ongoing empirical 
work. In this respect, Monica Kurath’s 
paper is ahead of mine, as it presents 
a completed comparative study of na-
no-science governance based on the 
concept of social robustness (Kurath 
2009). In my view, Kurath’s paper thus 
constitutes a fruitful step beyond my 
own reflections. I am pleased to note 
that her analysis indeed addresses a 
number of the dimensions I suggest 
as central for empirical inquiries in 
the final pages of my paper, such as 
institutional embedding, procedural 
design, and discursive dynamics, and 
does so in a grounded and hands-on 
manner. However, her more opera-
tional approach to questions I pose 
only at an abstract and analytical 
level also illustrates some of the ca-
veats I believe are entailed in apply-
ing the concept of ‘social robustness’ 
for comparative empirical analysis. I 
shall discuss some of these in the fol-
lowing. However, I should emphasize 
that I am keenly aware that Kurath 
has faced the more challenging task 
of leaving the academic office and 
confront theories with actual, social 
practice. This inevitably makes mat-
ters more complicated compared to 
isolated theoretical reflection. There-
fore, the following comments should 
be read as constructive suggestions 
for further work, not as a polemic 
against the work done by Kurath.
I divide my comments in three sec-
tions: The first one deals with the 
epistemological status of the concept 
of ‘social robustness’. The second per-
tains to the comparability of the cases 
presented in Kurath’s paper. The third 
regards the question of how more 
explanatory or interpretive value can 
be gained from analyzing this kind of 
material. However, I shall start with a 
preliminary observation on Kurath’s 
adoption of the concept of social ro-
bustness. 
Originally, the term ‘social robust-
ness’ in the Mode 2 diagnosis pertains 
to novel demands made on (academic) 
knowledge production from the sur-
rounding society (claiming that the 
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borders between scientific knowledge 
production and ‘society’ are eroding). 
Kurath moves the application of the 
concept from the domain of (scientif-
ic) knowledge production to the realm 
of (nano-science) governance. She ar-
gues that “The openness of social ro-
bustness well matches the analytical 
needs of a study of societal processes 
or activities beyond science and aca-
demic knowledge production that in-
clude regulation, deliberation, public 
engagement and governance” (ibid. 
90). I consider this move unproblem-
atic. In fact, perhaps the concept is 
more suitable in the realm of govern-
ance than in knowledge production 
per se. However, with this move the 
concept also loses its radical edge, 
when compared to other conceptual-
izations of the interface between sci-
ence and society. Some of the appeal 
– but also much of the provocation  – 
of the Mode 2 thesis lies in the claim 
that the ‘epistemological core’ of con-
temporary science is empty (Nowotny 
et al. 2001; 179). This claim is impor-
tant as normative underpinning of the 
calls for a reconfigured and less hier-
archical interaction between experts 
and lay-people. Kurath thus navigated 
around some of the epistemological 
intricacies affiliated with the Mode 2 
diagnosis by looking ‘only’ at govern-
ance, as it is much less controversial 
to claim that governance of science – 
as opposed to science proper  – must 
be open to inputs from the outside, 
in order to be ‘socially robust’. None-
theless, my first comment regards the 
epistemological status of the concept 
of social robustness, but from a slight-
ly different angle.
Social robustness – empirical re-
ality of normative standard?
Some of the criticism that has been 
leveled against the Mode 2 diagnosis 
pertains exactly to its epistemological 
status (e.g. Shinn 2002). The authors 
have been criticized for oscillating 
between, on the one hand, claiming 
to describe a shift from a Mode 1 to 
a Mode 2 knowledge production, as a 
set of ongoing social processes (em-
pirical reality), on the one hand, and 
presenting a normative standard on 
the other, an ideal to be aimed for in 
order to stimulate innovation, miti-
gate risks and enhance legitimacy of 
techno-scientific development.1 Ku-
rath decisively opts for the second op-
tion and makes ‘social robustness’ the 
normative standard against which her 
cases are measured. She constructs 
a social robustness-index composed 
of measures of five analytical dimen-
sions (‘contextualization’, ‘stability’, 
‘acceptability’, ‘social knowledge’ 
and ‘evaluation’). Also, this choice is 
a perfectly legitimate move, although 
the methodological aspects of the in-
dex construction and scores can be 
discussed.2 In my eyes, however, this 
use of the concept of social robust-
ness raises two questions, which are 
not addressed in Kurath’s paper. The 
first has to do with how we interpret 
the performance or ‘compliance’ with 
the standard. The second has to do 
with why this particular standard in 
this particular operationalization is 
selected and how it relates to other 
possible standards, which could per-
haps be applied in an equally mean-
ingful manner to assess the cases. 
Out of the total of 20 either ‘regula-
tory’ or ‘public-engaging’ events or 
processes analysed in the paper, most 
score rather poorly on the social ro-
bustness-index. According to Kurath 
1  As I noted in my paper, the Mode 2 
thesis seems in particular to be embraced 
by policy makers for its normative 
implications, rather than its empirical 
substantiation, a point that seems to be 
supported by Kurath’s findings.
2  The social robustness index consists of 5 
components, which are each assigned one 
of three values (-1, 0, 1, but also at some 
point 0.5) and summed. The score system, 
the fact that the five dimensions are given 
the same weight and the principles of score 
assignments, are all issues that could be 
given further consideration. However, 
I accept that for the sake of simplicity 
pragmatic choices need to be made.
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this is a cause for concern regarding 
the democratic accountability of the 
resulting governance of nano-sci-
ence. I concur this is a valid and per-
tinent concern. However, this result 
could also lead us to question the vi-
ability of the concept of social robust-
ness from an analytic rather than a 
normative angle. We could ask em-
pirically whether ‘social robustness’ is 
in fact a good tool to grasp the em-
pirical reality of those processes. The 
very mixed scores on the index could 
thus be used to question the empiri-
cal viability of Nowotny et al.’s claim 
that we are moving towards a Mode 2 
relationship between science and so-
ciety. Perhaps some of the processes 
were instigated with entirely different 
purposes than achieving ‘social ro-
bustness’ as envisioned in the Mode 
2 thesis. In that case, a low score on 
the social robustness-index may not 
be an entirely fair or relevant evalu-
ation of the processes and organiza-
tions examined, and we may need 
other tools to get an analytical grip on 
the intrinsic dynamics and external 
effects of these processes. 
When it comes to public engage-
ment with technology alone (a sub-
set of Kurath’s cases) there is a lively 
discussion on how best to evaluate 
such processes.3 Kurath’s social ro-
bustness index might benefit from 
being confronted, compared or sup-
plemented with other evaluative cri-
teria discussed in the literature (see 
e.g. discussions in Rowe and Frewer 
2000, Renn et al. 1995, Abels and Bora 
2000, Horlick-Jones et al. 2007). When 
it comes to evaluation of ‘governance’ 
in the broader sense of processes that 
move beyond conventional ‘govern-
ment’, the number of frameworks and 
3 Personally, I think that there has 
been a tendency for the discussion on 
normative standards to take precedence 
over actual empirical analysis of public 
engagement activities, which means 
that the accumulation of knowledge and 
experiences across cases are less than 
satisfactory. 
approaches on offer are even more 
abundant (to name just one contri-
bution to this discussion, see Borrás 
and Conzelmann 2007). The point is 
not that the social robustness index is 
flawed, but it appears somewhat arbi-
trary and could be qualified through 
a more elaborate confrontation with 
normative and conceptual alterna-
tives, which might reorder the scores 
of the cases.
Rendering cases comparable, 
managing diversity
My second comment pertains to the 
comparability of the cases entailed 
in Kurath’s study. In my own paper 
I suggest that comparability is not 
an intrinsic characteristic of cases. 
Rather comparability must be estab-
lished through the researcher’s cali-
bration of the distinctions through 
which selected aspects of the social 
world are observed. Comparative re-
search therefore needs to balance the 
need for similarity (selecting cases of 
the same phenomenon) and distinc-
tiveness (ensuring enough variation 
is observable), in order to establish 
worthwhile comparisons. Kurath ar-
gues that her cases are similar-in-
kind in so far, as they are all examples 
of a novel approach to the regulation 
of nano-science. As such, all the cas-
es allegedly embody or express a gen-
eral shift from (hierarchical) ‘govern-
ment’ to (network-like or deliberative) 
‘governance’. I find this overall fram-
ing of the cases convincing enough 
for the present purpose. Yet, one may 
nonetheless wonder, if perhaps there 
is too much diversity among the se-
lected cases to make analytically 
fruitful comparisons. The cases are 
not only drawn from four different 
national, one supranational and one 
international context, they also span 
both public and private initiatives (or 
what should perhaps more appropri-
ately be labeled corporatist) and seem 
from the description in the annexes to 
have quite different aims, serve quite 
different purposes for their sponsors 
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and comprise very different modes of 
communication. As a consequence, 
Kurath furthermore distinguishes be-
tween cases as ‘soft law measures’, 
‘self-regulatory initiatives’ and ‘public 
engagement projects’. All in all, this 
amounts to quite a lot of variation on 
quite a lot of dimensions among the 
20 cases included in the study. As a 
consequence, it is not entirely clear 
what kind of lessons can be drawn 
from the performance scores assigned 
to the cases. In a next step it may per-
haps be recommendable to focus on 
a smaller subset of the cases, holding 
some of this variance constant, which 
would allow for more in-depth analy-
sis, including more contextual fea-
tures. This brings me to my third and 
final comment.
Learning from comparative 
analysis
In my paper I comment critically on 
the fact that a lot of research on pub-
lic engagement is either dealing with 
normative reflections or focusing nar-
rowly on single cases, thus ignoring 
the potential of comparative research. 
In my view, one strength of Kurath’s 
paper lies in the fact that it presents 
and compares a significant number of 
cases. However, processing such a rich 
material in a journal article comes at a 
price. In this case, the price is that the 
empirical sections of the paper have 
a largely descriptive and classificatory 
nature. This is perfectly respectable, 
but hopefully the effort will not be ter-
minated here. In a next step it would 
be nice to see more of an explana-
tory or interpretive effort, to account 
in more detail for (perhaps selected 
aspects of) the similarities and differ-
ences among the cases. How can the 
variance covered by the cases be in-
terpreted or explained? For instance, 
what difference does it make for a 
governance initiative whether it is or-
ganized by a private organization/as-
sociation compared to a state agency 
or an international organization? This 
will likely impinge on both the public 
legitimacy and the policy impact of 
the procedure. Similarly, is it possible 
to establish any (systematic) effects of 
the national context, in which the pro-
cedures are embedded? It seems rea-
sonable to expect that they are both 
shaped by and play into different insti-
tutional settings and political cultures. 
It is mentioned in a footnote (note 8, 
p. 91) that the aim of the study was to 
undertake a transatlantic comparison. 
But this comparative perspective does 
not really appear in the analysis. In 
my own paper I argue that systematic 
comparative analysis of processes of 
public engagement should form an 
important way forward in our under-
standing of the pros and cons of pub-
lic engagement. Therefore, I would 
welcome an attempt to further exam-
ine differences and similarities across 
the cases in a more interpretive and/
or explanatory fashion. The ambition 
is already present in the paper as Ku-
rath argues that 
“Questions will focus on the ways gover-
nance has been embedded in social, 
cultural, political and historic contexts, 
and their relations with current policy 
and technology discourses, which in-
clude environmental, health and safety 
(EHS) issues” (p. 91). 
However, one may wonder whether 
the operationalization of this dimen-
sion in questions about whether the 
regulatory schemes are based on 
‘standards’ or ‘principles’, and wheth-
er the public engagement processes 
are focused on ‘information provi-
sion’ or ‘deliberation’, actually pro-
vides enough information to address 
the question of contextualization sat-
isfactorily. In any case, the measure-
ment stops short of making any kind 
of causal inferences, which in my view 
should form a desirable next step. 
This may, however, require concep-
tual and methodological tools beyond 
what the Mode 2 framework delivers. 
Concluding remarks
Kurath summarises her analysis in the 
following manner: 
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“These findings contest the idea that de-
liberative governance projects and pub-
lic upstream engagement in NST exem-
plify a paradigm shift in techno-political 
discourse and will lead toward the more 
democratic development of technology 
that is advocated by proponents of the 
upstream engagement approach … In 
fact, governance projects still appear to 
limit public engagement to values, and 
social and ethical matters, rather than 
to expose expertise to scrutiny…” (p. 
102). 
I believe this conclusion is warranted 
and it corresponds well with my own 
observations and concerns regarding 
the actual impact of the discourses 
about expanded public engagement 
(e.g. Hansen 2010). It certainly should 
give rise to normative concerns when 
“political responsibility is distributed 
and deliberated among a variety of 
actors in different societal domains” 
(ibid.), but no actor or institution can 
be held democratically accountable. 
Indeed this would appear as an em-
pirically grounded example of Ulrich 
Beck’s catch phrase of ‘organized ir-
responsibility’ (Beck 1999). 
However, looking only at cases which 
supposedly embody this alleged new 
mode of governance we do not learn 
anything about what remains of con-
ventional ‘government’ in the field of 
nano-science. Do these novel pro-
cesses of governance replace conven-
tional government completely, or are 
they rather layered on top of a more 
conventional regulatory structure? If 
so, is this a good or a bad thing, given 
the somewhat questionable perfor-
mance of the processes surveyed for 
their ability to establish social robust-
ness? 
This last question may also serve as a 
call for conceptual and methodologi-
cal self-reflection. If we find that gov-
ernance processes do not deliver what 
some expect in terms of legitimacy 
and rationality gains, is it then neces-
sarily a sign that democratic control 
of techno-scientific dynamics is being 
undermined? Or is it perhaps an indi-
cation that existing institutions and 
organizational arrangements of gov-
ernance are more resilient than some 
scholars currently suggest.4 While we 
should certainly be aware of the kind 
of democratic problems identified by 
Kurath, we should also ask whether 
the government/governance distinc-
tion constitutes mutually exclusionary 
categories and whether the concept of 
social robustness is an adequate and 
sufficiently sensitive tool to analyse 
the ongoing developments at the in-
terface of techno-science, politics and 
the larger public. 
References
Beck, U. (1999) World Risk Society, Polity 
Press, London
Bora, A. and Abels, G. (2004) Demok-
ratische Technikbewertung, transcript 
Verlag, Bielefeld.
Borrás, S. and Conzelmann, T. (2007) De-
mocracy, Legitimacy and Soft Modes of 
Governance in the EU: The Empirical 
Turn’, in Journal of European Integration, 
Vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 531-48.
Hansen, J. (2009) ‘Mode 2, Systems Dif-
ferentiation and the Significance of Po-
litico-Cultural Variety. Reflections on the 
theoretical foundation of comparative 
analysis of public engagement practic-
es’, in STI-Studies, Vol 5, pp. 67-86.
Hansen, J. (2010) Biotechnology and Public 
Engagement in Europe, Palgrave-Mac-
Millan, Basingstoke.
Horlich-Jones, T. et al. (2007), The GM De-
bate. Risk, politics and public engage-
ment. Routledge, London.
Kurath, M. (2009) ‘Nanotechnology Gov-
ernance. Accountability and Democ-
racy in New Modes of Regulation and 
Deliberation, in STI-Studies, Vol. 5,  pp. 
87-110.
4  Kurath herself seems to be leaning 
towards this interpretation, when she 
argues that,”… the notion of a boundary 
separating science and the public into two 
societal actors on either side of an expert/
lay divide, and the focus on old contrast 
structures that further set a unified science 
and an illiterate public in opposition, 
persist in most of the projects” (Kurath 
2009: 102).
86   STI Studies 2010: 81–86
Nowotny, H., Scott, P. and Gibbons, M. 
(2001) Re-Thinking Science, Polity Press, 
Cambridge.
Renn, O., Webler, T., Wiedemann, P. (eds.) 
(1995), Fairness and Competence in Citi-
zen Participation: Evaluation Models for 
Environmental Discourse, Kluver Aca-
demic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/
London.
Rowe, G. and Frewer, L. (2000) ‘Public Par-
ticipations Methods: A Framework for 
Evaluation’, Science, Technology & Hu-
man Values, vol. 25, pp. 3-29.
Shinn, T. (2002) ‘The Triple Helix and New 
Production of Knowledge: Prepackaged 
Thinking on Science and Technology’, 
Social Studies of Science, vol. 32, pp. 559-
614.
